M
ore that 20 years ago, Alm, McKee, and Beck (1990, p. 23) wrote, Beleaguered by declining tax revenues and mounting expenditures, many state governments in recent years have sought alternative and novel revenue sources. One approach that has been used by twenty-eight states since 1981 is the tax amnesty.
At the time, those states had conducted a total of 37 amnesties, and the programs still carried a sense of being a new development for American government fi nance. Amnesties seemed to be a tool more appropriate for chronically non-compliant European or developing countries, which could use them to boost collections and possibly compliance. American observers were principally worried about the consequences of tax amnesties for voluntary compliance, especially if taxpayers developed an expectation that the next amnesty might be just on the horizon. 1 The reviews of these early efforts concluded that tax amnesties were fi rst and foremost a tool for improving tax administration. In a study of the fi rst 26 state amnesty programs, Mikesell (1986) examined their structural features, noting throughout how these attributes contributed to the state system of tax administration. In a pair of independent surveys of state tax administrators, Ross (1986) and Parle and Hirlinger (1986) reviewed the goals and objectives of the early amnesty programs.
2 They similarly found relatively little interest among the states in boosting short-term revenue, as emphasis was placed on bundling the amnesty with other enforcement strategies and improved compliance initiatives.
After 117 programs (and counting) over 30 years, 3 we argue in this paper that amnesties have evolved into a standard component of American state tax collection systems with a purpose quite different from the administrative functions described in the contributions of Mikesell, Parle and Hirlinger, and Ross cited above. Specifi cally, we argue that amnesties have become tools of revenue generation, and that this is being pursued even at the expense of existing systems of tax administration. To demonstrate this, the fi rst part of this article provides a narrative analysis of the path of state tax amnesty programs since 1981, paying particular attention to the amnesty features highlighted in Mikesell (1986) . This overview demonstrates the differences in structure between the early surge of amnesties in the 1980s and more recent amnesties (the 66 conducted or scheduled since 2000). This paper then regresses amnesty recoveries against features of the amnesty programs. The empirical evidence indicates that most program features that are correlated with greater recoveries are those which confl ict with tax administration concerns.
The layout of the paper is as follows. The next section provides background on tax amnesties drawing on the previous literature especially as it pertains to systems of tax administration. Section II discusses the pattern of amnesty offerings and revenue recoveries across the states over time. Section III proceeds with a narrative analysis of how the program features within the amnesties have evolved over time to refl ect a tool for revenue generation rather than improving administration. Section IV presents an empirical analysis of how these features actually affect revenue recovery, and Section V concludes. Baer and LeBorgne (2008, p. 5) defi ne a tax amnesty to be "a limited-time offer by the government to a specifi ed group of taxpayers to pay a defi ned amount, in exchange for forgiveness of a tax liability (including interest and penalties), relating to a previous tax period(s), as well as freedom from legal prosecution."
I. THE AMNESTY IDEA
4 These temporary programs allow taxpayers who have previously evaded taxation to voluntarily remit unpaid taxes without incurring all the sanctions that failure of timely payment would ordinarily incur. If collected through enforcement action, taxpayers with these liabilities would owe the tax plus various penalties and interest on the unpaid amount and might also be subject to felony prosecution. By participating in the amnesty, taxpayers can avoid certain program-specifi ed consequences.
To consider the contribution and the complication that an amnesty might make to tax administration fi rst requires an understanding of tax administration itself. Penniman (1980, p.173 ) aptly characterized tax administration in this way: "… the tax offi cial's service can be generalized only in terms of the value of the revenue he collects for the operation of all government and in the fairness with which he collects such revenue within the state's tax framework." The tax amnesty likewise must balance revenue and fairness in the service of tax administration. One contribution is the extra revenue that may fl ow from the amnesty, which the amnesty no doubt accomplishes in a manner particularly appealing to elected representatives. Amnesty collections emerge without the politically diffi cult tasks of increasing statutory rates or changing defi nitions in the tax base. Amnesty programs, however, raise equity concerns that likely impact the overall effi ciency of state tax administration. Because the money comes from those who previously had shirked payment, the amnesty understandably strikes the public as a special deal for evaders and therefore arguably violates principles of general fairness. Honest taxpayers may believe they have been cheated by the special deal provided to evaders, which could harm overall compliance by encouraging the attitude that waiting for the next amnesty is better than perpetual voluntary compliance. Since most major tax systems rely on voluntary compliance to generate collections, putting the honest taxpayer at regular economic disadvantage conceivably works against the efforts of an effi cient system of tax administration. Furthermore, the only new revenue truly generated by the amnesty comes from those collections that would not otherwise be uncovered through normal enforcement efforts. Amnesty programs are revenue losers on accounts whose collection would occur without forgiveness, but surrender interest and penalties nevertheless. Hence there is a concern that the amnesty may harm the compliance climate and discriminate against the honest taxpayer for what may be little true new revenue. The diffi culty in accomplishing this balancing act between obtaining additional revenues and harming the compliance climate is the source of the reluctance that states historically had in regard to the amnesties.
The compliance effect of the amnesty seems crucial both in terms of revenue potential and as a signal of equity implications, but empirical evidence of such an impact is far from conclusive due to the complexity of the research question. A few studies have studied individual amnesty programs and the responses by taxpayers over time. From a random sample of tax amnesty participants, Fisher, Goodeeris, and Young (1989) found that the early Michigan experience did not signifi cantly bring previously unknown delinquent taxpayers permanently back to the tax rolls. Instead, they found that most amnesty participants were taxpayers known to the state who were paying only a portion of unpaid liabilities, and that a high estimate of the new taxpayers remaining on the rolls permanently was about 21 percent; Christian, Gupta, and Young (2002) came to similar conclusions on the same Michigan-1 (1986) amnesty after examining subsequent fi lings over a longer time horizon. Likewise, Joulfaian (1989) found that more than half of the Massachusetts-1 (1983) program participants were known delinquents, and 70 percent of their liabilities were less than four years old, which are the most likely to be collected under routine operations. Alm and Beck (1993) found no effect, positive or negative, in a careful time-series analysis of tax collection levels and trends that could be attributed to the 1985 Colorado amnesty program. Though informative, the main drawback of these single program ex-post analyses is that there is no variation at the program level; there are also concerns regarding their external validity. Luitel and Sobel (2007) extended the literature by examining multiple states over time by drawing upon 37 state quarterly revenue collections with "regular" tax systems between 1981 and 2004. 5 In a series of panel fi xed effect regressions, they found robust evidence that repeated offerings of amnesty reduced state revenue collections, which is consistent with a compliance problem in post-amnesty periods. A limitation of the Luitel and Sobel (2007) analysis, however, was the diffi culty in determining whether a downward trend in revenue collections following each amnesty iteration was a consequence of the amnesty itself, or if instead states repeatedly offer and reoffer amnesties because of persistent revenue problems. Alm, McKee, and Beck (1990) found that participant taxpayer compliance decreased with amnesty offerings in an experimental setting, better allowing for the randomization not found in real world policy. In their experiment, subjects were divided into different sessions where they would voluntarily report their income for taxation over 25 rounds.
By itself, the introduction of an amnesty did appear to lower compliance, but introducing new enforcement strategies and making promises of the amnesty being a "one-time event" appeared to be successful in offsetting this effect. This might be considered the strongest evidence that improving long-run compliance post-amnesty is possible, but it is not clear that the experimental settings transfer to the real world of politics and policy. For instance, lab administrators might be considered more credible by their subjects in such promises than state policy makers would be by their constituencies.
Though all the studies have their limitations, the preponderance of evidence is against the view that amnesties increase long-run revenues. The clearest conclusion from this research is that the fi scal contribution of an amnesty is in the direct recovery during the amnesty but not later.
6 Therefore, it is important to measure and understand this direct recovery revenue because it may well be the only fi scal contribution of the amnesty.
II. AMNESTIES AND THEIR RECOVERIES
Since 1980, 45 states plus the District of Columbia have conducted at least one formal tax amnesty program; all but 11 of these have run more than one program, certainly casting doubt on the claims sometimes made by the states that the program offers a "one-time opportunity" for an honest, new start with the tax authorities.
7 Figure 1 shows the annual frequency of state programs during the American amnesty era from 1981.
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The 1980s were a period of aggressive experimentation with 33 amnesty programs in 30 states, with Florida, Illinois, and Louisiana having repeated programs. Amnesties of this time did not stem from fi scal stress, but as Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1992) note, they were likely a state reaction to reduced federal enforcement efforts in that period that resulted in a lower compliance environment.
9 State tax offi cials described the amnesties in terms of improving and updating their administrative systems (Parle and Hirlinger, 1986) , and this was likewise refl ected in the amnesty features and accompanying programs (Mikesell, 1986) . 6 Baer and LeBorgne (2008) review research on both American and international amnesties. They also conclude that there is no evidence of a positive impact on revenue fl ows after the amnesty and some evidence of a negative impact. 7 The fi ve states abstaining from amnesties are Alaska, Montana, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. It is noteworthy that four of these fi ve states omit a major broad based tax, but this observation is not particularly conclusive since other states without such taxes have offered amnesties multiple times. Likewise, Alaska, Tennessee, and Wyoming rely more on revenues from extractive resources, but Texas has a similar tax base and has offered three amnesties.. 8 Note that 14 of the amnesties started in one year and ended in the next. This and later fi gures will follow the convention of counting the amnesty and its recovery in the start year. There is no reliable way of parsing the recoveries between years or of identifying any installment payments, in the few instances in which they have been permitted, to a later year. These magnitudes are modest, in any case. 9 In a later unpublished study, LeBorgne (2006) fi nds amnesties are more likely when a state is experiencing a budget defi cit. However, LeBorgne's analysis stops in 1996 before the diffi cult recessionary environment of the 2000s and the concurrent fl urry of amnesties. Luitel and Tosun (2010) extend the analysis up to 2005 and likewise fi nd fi scal stress to be an important determinant of amnesty (re)enactment.
The amnesty pace declined in the 1990s, when there were only 18 occurrences, eight of which came from states offering programs for the fi rst time. The 2000s brought a fl urry of 51 amnesties, however, and 15 more have been conducted in 2010, 2011, or are already scheduled for 2012. The fi gure shows dramatic increases in amnesties at both ends of the period from 2000 to the present. This pattern is almost certainly related to the declines in state tax collections during and shortly after the recessions of 2001 and 2007-2009, combined with general public opposition to statutory tax increases as a source of additional revenue. 11 Second, where data on the cost of running an amnesty are available, such cost is modest in comparison with collections, so reporting revenues on a net basis would have little impact on the amounts. In many instances, the amnesty program is administered with resources redirected from an existing department, and as a result the reported program cost is zero because there was no special budget appropriation. Third, there has been no standard approach to calculating program cost, meaning that there would be considerable inconsistency in reporting for net numbers. States which report "net revenues" may or may not have counted an estimate of forgone penalties and interest as program costs, for instance. For these reasons, gross collections are appropriate for comparing and evaluating the results of state amnesty programs. The vagaries of the data reporting process dictate considerable caution in use of the results. These are important data, however, because they remain the common basis on which states evaluate and promote the success of the amnesty. Because the existing evidence suggests there is no positive impact on revenue fl ow after the amnesty (Baer and LeBorgne, 2008) , and that the impact may even be negative, the emphasis on the fi scal contribution of the direct amnesty recoveries is the appropriate focus of attention.
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In the aggregate, state amnesties report over $10.7 billion in recoveries (when adjusted to 2005 prices), a substantial but modest number in comparison to the $1.3 trillion total tax revenues collected during the equivalent periods. Revenue production has, however, varied widely across state programs. In real terms, the greatest collections were from the California-2 (2005) program ($683.4 million) and the New Jersey-4 (2009) program ($661.7 million), and the smallest were from the Illinois-1 (1981) program ($165.9 thousand) and the North Dakota-1 (1983) program in ($259.2 thousand). The largest amnesty numbers are big enough to draw public attention to the results, even though the proceeds look much smaller when compared to the total tax revenues of the state. For instance, total tax collections in New Jersey in 2009 exceeded $24 billion -the amnesty proceeds were 2.7 percent of that amount, which is hardly enough to dramatically change the state's fundamental fi scal situation and not a fl ow that would be a permanent component of annual revenue.
States do not report the type of tax for which the amnesty has made a recovery as regularly as they report total recoveries. Table 2 shows the distribution across taxes for 11 One exception to this use of gross rather than net collections is in regard to reporting for state lottery revenue in Bureau of Census Governments Division state revenue reports. This revenue is included in state revenue data on a net basis in miscellaneous revenues. 12 Even gross recovery can be a misleading indication of fi scal contribution. In one of the few careful analyses of the quality of amnesty revenue, the New York State Offi ce of Tax Policy Analysis (2004) the 23 states for which these data are available. 13 The table also presents the distribution of total tax revenue across taxes so that a comparison with amnesty results can be made. The table focuses on sales and use, individual income, and corporate income taxes because these are the most signifi cant taxes in these states; furthermore, the total recoveries from the three exceed 80 percent of the total in all but four of the states. It is apparent the amnesties vary dramatically in regard to the relative yields for the three taxes. While the averages across all states are similar -around 30 percent for eachthe variation from state to state is dramatic: sales and use tax shares range from 6.56 percent (Missouri-1 (1983) ) to 70.09 percent (Louisiana-1 (1985) ); individual income tax shares range from 4.53 percent (Missouri-1 (1983) ) to 81 percent (Arkansas-1 (1987)); corporate income tax shares range from 2.16 percent (New York-3 (2002) ) to 87.91 percent (Missouri-1 (1983) ).
14 For some states, recoveries are heavily drawn from the sales and use tax, and for others the income tax is the primary source.
15 Seldom is there a close balance between recovery shares of sales and use and individual income taxes for an individual state. The table shows both a close balance in virtually all states between the revenues from sales and use and individual income taxes and only a modest contribution from the corporate income tax to total tax revenue. Amnesty recovery patterns diverge substantially from that, possibly revealing some differences in the level of evasion across taxes, but it is just as likely that this divergence simply reveals a difference in amnesty participation for unknown reasons.
Although these amnesty recoveries were no doubt welcome, in comparison with the size of fi scal defi cits being experienced by many American states in the aftermath of the Great Recession, they were modest. To the extent that state fi scal problems are structural and not cyclical, the onetime revenue from the amnesty will not provide the needed solution and will harm a state's long term fi scal prospects to the extent it creates the feared compliance incentive problem.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF AMNESTY STRUCTURE: FROM ADMINISTRATIVE TO REVENUE CONCERN
There are several important program design differences across the state amnesties, and these features can be critical to determining how much revenue the amnesty immediately recovers relative to its impact on the state tax compliance climate. 
A. Eligible Liabilities and Applicants
The tax previously unpaid to states may include several logical categories: accounts receivable, taxes from delinquent fi lers who may be either accounts known to the tax department or previously unknown, taxes from incomplete prior returns, and taxes from fi rms or fi lers previously unknown to the state. 16 While some early amnesties provided extremely limited eligibility (Texas-1 (1984) limited eligibility to unregistered merchants and Idaho-1 (1983) limited eligibility to periods in which no return had been fi led), such narrow eligibility has been the exception.
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The major distinction across the earlier amnesties was the inclusion of accounts receivable in the program. While the amnesties of the 1980s were closely divided in the eligibility of these liabilities (15 included them, while 18 did not), amnesties since then have overwhelmingly included accounts receivable (63 have, while only 21 have not). In 1986, Mikesell pointed out that inclusion of accounts receivable in amnesty eligibility was at that time a strong distinguishing feature between programs with high per capita recoveries and those with low per capita recoveries, and Alm and Beck (1991) would later fi nd the inclusion of accounts receivable to be a statistically signifi cant determinant of total amnesty recoveries. Since then, states have overwhelmingly included liabilities in accounts receivable, even though these represent the softest results in terms of producing new net revenue and in terms of rewarding non-compliance. Because the liability is both known and established, these revenues are most likely going to be collected through the enforcement mechanisms available to the state if the taxpayer has any recoverable fi nancial resources. Taxpayers truly without the means to get current from accounts receivable would be unlikely to have the means to become current through an amnesty program. It is diffi cult to view the inclusion of accounts receivable as having a purpose beyond speeding up the collection process by a few months.
B. Forgiveness of Penalties and Interest
Features that characterize all state amnesty programs include the following: they do not forgive the basic tax owed, they do not close tax years for potential audit, and they all waive criminal prosecution for violations included in the amnesty. Beyond those elements, the state programs mix varying degrees of forgiveness of fi nancial penalties and interest that would have otherwise been owed by the non-compliant taxpayer. Table  3 shows that amnesties have extended more toward forgiveness of interest across the decades. In the 1980s, amnesties generally provided for cancelled penalties, but continued at least part of the interest liability. For the 2000s, virtually all amnesties granted 16 Accounts receivable includes "tax evaders who have already been detected by the tax administration and who have been sent notices of their new tax bills" (Baer and LeBorgne, 2008, p. 17) . 17 One extreme exception was the Massachusetts-4 (2010) amnesty that limited eligibility to taxpayers who received a special "Tax Amnesty Notice" from the state. While sending notices of the amnesty to taxpayers is not exceptional, making the amnesty an "invitation only" event -and simultaneously promising extra penalties to those who do not participate -certainly is.
at least partial interest forgiveness. 18 The pattern of interest relief continues into the 2010s, when 12 of the 15 amnesties so far have provided at least partial interest relief in addition to penalty relief. Because many states in recent years have at least an informal program of providing penalty relief for any taxpayer who makes a voluntary disclosure of unknown liabilities, the forgiveness of penalty in formal amnesty program provides little marginal incentive, meaning that the best remaining award for enticing taxpayers into the amnesty program involves reductions in interest payments. This is likely the reason for the gradual shift in the extent to which this incentive is offered to bring taxpayers into the system. At their least generous, the Florida-3 (1992) and Illinois-1 (1981) programs offered only amnesty from prosecution.
In many respects, forgiving interest is the most sensitive element of the amnesty in terms of maintaining equity and compliance incentives. The programs do not relieve the basic tax obligation, so that is not an issue, and the penalty has been demonstrated not to have its intended effect if the taxpayer is delinquent, so it involves no great revenue loss if waived. But to forgive interest is tantamount to giving the evaders an interest-free loan, and that gives the tax cheat an economic advantage over honest taxpayers. 19 This advantage clearly has been on the minds of amnesty designers, as several programs have only a partial or no interest waiver. Interest obligations do accumulate on older liabilities, however, and some recent programs have created special higher waiver rates for such older obligations. 20 The recent Florida program went as far as distinguishing between taxpayers who are being audited or under inquiry, examination, and civil investigation and those who initiate contact with the Department of Taxation. The former may receive a waiver of 25 percent of interest while the latter may receive a 50 percent waiver. For the few amnesties providing data on the age of the delinquent liability collected, however, a large amount of the total recovery comes from accounts that only recently became delinquent. Figure 2 demonstrates this point by summing the total recoveries by age of delinquency for the six amnesty programs that report these data, and then dividing it by total amnesty collections. Within these aggregates, the percentages of total recovery from tax years no more distant than fi ve years are 77.15 for Kentucky-2 (2002), 81.8 for West Virginia-2 (2004 ), 71.54 for Indiana-1 (2005 , 18 While interest rates were historically low in the 2000s, it would be premature to conclude that this meant the waiver of accrued interest was unimportant. First, the interest rates states charge against delinquent payments are typically higher than "risk-free" Treasury bill rates, though the mark-up usually differs by the type of liability. Second, interest accrues throughout the period taxpayers are delinquent, so the history of interest rates over the lifetime of the liability is usually more important than the spot rate at the time the amnesty declares a waiver of accrued interest. 19 Since the 1980s, the prime interest rate has been on a path of secular decline. Using tax delinquency as a source of operating capital is thus relatively less attractive now than in the past -credit-worthy businesses can get the money at low interest rates from traditional sources. Furthermore, to the extent that the interest rate on delinquent payments generally tracks market rates, the state sacrifi ces less by forgiving interest. Both infl uences work toward making interest waivers more likely. 1995) . Recoveries from delinquent accounts of less than a year or two are often not eligible for amnesty, which is a policy intended to prevent taxpayers from becoming delinquent just for the purposes of participating in the amnesty, effectively treating the state as a short-term loan offi cer. It would seem from these data that programs which offer only a limited look back for amnesty would likely not be forgoing signifi cant revenue. Also, devoting signifi cant resources to collecting older accounts might not represent a prudent investment for a state tax compliance department.
C. Amnesty Length
State amnesty programs run for a limited number of days. Requests for amnesty must be fi led within a specifi c period in order to be eligible for consideration. The early amnesties tended to run for about three months. Later amnesties are shorter, now averaging close to two months. That would be consistent with taking advantage of the improved communication and information technology systems that have developed in the past quarter century of amnesty history. As one might surmise, the amnesty record shows that a longer amnesty period is associated with a lower recovery per day during the program, as participation is either fi xed or only increases at a diminishing rate with amnesty length. For amnesties of 60 or fewer days, the median daily recovery is $744,848, while for amnesties of 80 to 100 days, it is $278,852, and for amnesties of 110 days or longer, $95,076. The shortened amnesty period that has emerged suggests that amnesty design has responded to this pattern of diminished returns from long programs.
D. Quarter in Which Amnesty Conducted
Amnesties have tended to be conducted in the later quarters of the calendar year (i.e., the beginning of most state fi scal years). In the early amnesty era, there was a concern that amnesties earlier in the year would confl ict with the heaviest part of income tax fi ling season and that adding this work would complicate both administration and compliance. These administrative and compliance concerns appear to have become somewhat less important in the most recent decade with more programs offered earlier in the year. The third calendar quarter is the most popular quarter for an amnesty, with 45 percent of all programs conducted then.
E. Installment Plans
The amnesty programs differ in regard to whether they require the full liability be paid during the amnesty period (or shortly thereafter) to receive the amnesty incentive or whether they allow the taxpayer to establish an installment plan for payment of the liability over some period in the future. Since participants in amnesty programs have shown themselves to be less than reliable taxpayers, it may be surprising that amnesty programs established such installment programs at all. 21 However, if the objective is to improve compliance and administration, these installment plans serve the purpose of enticing such taxpayers to at least come forward and make themselves known, even if they ultimately cannot fulfi ll the obligations of their payment plans.
Here again the data presented in Table 3 show a considerable change in structure when later amnesties are compared to earlier ones. In the amnesties of the 1980s, 17 programs allowed installment payments while 16 did not. There was also a close split for the 1990s amnesties, with eight programs allowing amnesties while nine did not. But that changed in the 2000s, as only 15 of the 51 amnesties permitted installment plans and only one of 15 amnesties to date in the 2010s have allowed an installment payment option. 21 In fact, state amnesty reports often indicate that taxpayer failure to comply with installment plans is a common reason for amnesty denial. For instance, the New York-3 (2002) amnesty program reported that more than 100,000 of the 120,000 amnesty applications that were denied were due to taxpayers failing to complete an installment program, though they still collected more than $35 million in revenue from this group (New York State Offi ce of Tax Policy Analysis, 2004). The 120,000 denied applicants represented 11 percent of the total applications in the New York-3 (2002) amnesty program.
F. Accompanying Programs
Amnesties have often been bundled with other programs, revealing a mixture of interest in both recovering tax revenue and in favorably infl uencing the compliance climate. In an early study, Mikesell (1986, pp. 522-523) found amnesty programs to be accompanied by additional programs designed to improve future compliance, and even argued that the amnesty may have been the cover necessary to make such enforcement enhancements and other changes to the rules "politically palatable." These programs increased penalties and interest for the future, made tax evasion a felony, promised more rigorous enforcement, introduced new computer technologies, and allowed for improved audit detection techniques, among other changes (Mikesell, 1986; Alm and Beck, 1991) .
In contrast, it does not seem to be the case that the more recent programs can be viewed as providing political cover for ramping up enforcement practices. Most of the recent amnesties are in states that had offered amnesty in the past and had made substantive administrative changes with the earlier amnesty, and thus had fewer opportunities to introduce new enforcement initiatives with their more recent amnesty programs. Table  4 identifi es the programs since 2000 that accompanied the amnesties, either directly in the legislation instituting the amnesty or in materials (guides, news releases, advertising, etc.) produced by the revenue administration about the amnesty. Recent programs have accompanying compliance programs less frequently than was the case for the early amnesties.
In the 58 amnesty programs identifi ed in Table 4 , only 26 bundled an accompanying program of any kind, suggesting the absence of a genuine interest in improving the long-run compliance effort. Furthermore, those programs that did take place do not have an orientation towards improving the overall compliance environment. Only 14 (including West Virginia-2 (2004), which has both compliance and recovery features) of the 26 programs made changes to the post-amnesty compliance environment by increasing penalties and interest, devoting amnesty proceeds to additional tax enforcement resources, or giving additional powers to tax enforcement. The remaining 12 amnesty programs listed in Table 4 were structured to increase recovery without providing changes to improve future compliance. These states structured their programs so that taxpayers who were eligible for the amnesty program but did not would be subject to extra penalties if discovered. In these cases, other future taxpayers would be subject to only ordinary penalties. Such a program creates an incentive to participate in the amnesty if a taxpayer is currently evading or delinquent, but has no effect on the long term revenue incentives and compliance of future possible evaders. Therefore, for most states, the amnesty was provided, but there were no changes in penalties, enforcement, or any other program that might make tax evasion less advantageous post-amnesty than pre-amnesty among the general population. The compliance rules and consequences would be expected to be no stricter after the amnesty.
The compliance initiatives attached to amnesties in recent years have been modest when compared to the changes that accompanied amnesties in the 1980s. This is also likely a consequence of the passage of time, as states were generally able to fi nd the 
G. Prior Amnesty Experience
As previously discussed, amnesties were often advertised as a last chance for tax compliance before stricter programs were implemented. Because of the considerable concern about the effects of an amnesty on the compliance environment, states felt it necessary to emphasize that, although the amnesty recoveries proved that many taxpayers had successfully evaded taxes in the past, conditions were changing and what had worked before would not work in the future. The amnesty provided the last opportunity to comply before the tax evasion was discovered and had even greater consequences. Obviously, virtually all amnesties conducted in the 1980s were the fi rst ones run by a state -but even then 10 percent were repeat programs. Overall, 62 percent of amnesties are repeat programs. Since the 1980s, the share of amnesties in a decade that were the fi rst run by the state has continually declined, from 44.4 percent in the 1990s to 13.7 percent in the 2000s, and then to 6.7 percent (one state) thus far in the 2010s. As noted earlier, only fi ve states have yet to conduct an amnesty, so the prospects for new programs this decade are not great.
Multiple amnesty states generally wait fi ve years or more before repeating an amnesty (more than eighty percent did so in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s), but only 73.3 percent have waited that long for the 2010s to date. The percentage of states waiting more than 10 years before running another amnesty has declined consistently, from 90 percent in the 1980s, to 72.2 percent in the 1990s, to 58.8 percent in the 2000s, and to 26.7 percent in the 2010s. Seldom would states now be able to make a convincing claim that an amnesty represents a unique opportunity to come clean with the state tax system. If one is run, there is likely to be another coming relatively soon. Of the 45 states plus the District of Columbia that have run or scheduled amnesties, only 11 have stopped with one (so far, at least), and 23 states have run three or more programs.
IV. ANALYZING THE AMNESTY EXPERIENCES: WHAT THE RECOVERY RECORD SHOWS
This section investigates empirically which amnesty features are associated with a productive amnesty program. A similar exercise was performed for the 28 earliest amnesty programs by Alm and Beck (1991) , who used amnesty revenues as a proxy for income tax evasion among the states, which they regressed on the expected determinants of income tax compliance. Of course, as Alm and Beck (1991) noted, this created measurement error problems since amnesties involved more taxes than just the income tax. As previously demonstrated in Table 2 , the amnesty recovery shares for various taxes often differ substantially from their shares in routine state tax collections. Therefore we model the output of an amnesty program as the result of a revenue production function of two classes of inputs: unpaid tax liabilities and amnesty program design. The latter input classifi cation has been the subject of the narrative analysis to this point in the paper. The amount of unpaid tax liabilities should naturally lead to larger amnesty recoveries, but is a stock of unknown size that must be captured with proxy variables. These proxy variables for unpaid liabilities include the share of total personal income coming from reported nonfarm proprietor income, the existence of a national recession, the intensity of federal audits, and the absence of a state sales tax. The amnesty program features will include indicators for repeat amnesties, the lag time between amnesties, the eligibility of accounts receivable, the implementation of an installment payment plan, the length of the amnesty, the quarter in which the amnesty was held, and whether or not there exists an alternative to the amnesty in the form of a voluntary disclosure program. These specifi c variables will be discussed in greater detail below.
The measure of amnesty output to be explained is the amnesty recovery as a share of the state's total tax revenue (in millions) in the previous year. Dividing recovery by revenue scales the data and mitigates the need to incorporate variables that explain the potential size of the tax base. Since amnesty recoveries are correlated with bringing new taxpayers onto the tax rolls, the amnesty recovery could be associated with increases in total tax revenues through improved compliance. As a result, recovery is scaled by the previous year's tax revenue to avoid this potential simultaneity bias in measurement, and this variable will be referred to as the recovery rate.
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Because states repeat infrequently, the model will be estimated as a pooled crosssection of the 108 state tax amnesty programs through 2010 for which complete data are available, though specifi cations to check the sensitivity of the model to outliers will also be presented. 24 The appendix provides descriptive statistics for this range of observations. The production of the amnesty recovery rate (RecoveryRate) will be modeled in a log-linear specifi cation, expressed in vector form as: Defi nitions, sources, and summary statistics are provided in the appendix. As previously described, the variables associated with coeffi cients b 1 through b 4 are intended to proxy for the amount of unpaid tax liabilities. Sales tax compliance is known to be particularly high, because the vendor acts only as a third party collection agent between customer and the government. 25 States that generate revenue without the use of the sales tax are therefore likely to have a larger stock of unpaid revenue. 26 Also, states overwhelmingly link their income tax compliance programs to federal efforts. States with greater federal compliance enforcement activity are likely to have lower state amnesty recovery potential, with the federal enforcement effort having spilled over to the state tax structure. Though data on federal audit intensity by state differ over time and are incomplete, the existing data do demonstrate that federal audit rates are systematically higher in some states than others (Birskyte, 2008) . 27 States that have an average ranking in the top-10 most audited states in the available data (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) are identifi ed as "high audit states" with a dummy variable (HighAuditState), with the expectation that these states will have lower recoveries in their amnesty programs than others (b 2 < 0). If recessions cause taxpayers to become delinquent or to evade their taxes, then they may be correlated with amnesty participation (b 3 > 0). Finally, states with high levels of self-employment likely have lower levels of routine tax compliance. 28 The amount of self-employment activity in the state is measured by the share of the state's total personal income derived from non-farm proprietor's income, and is expected to be positively related to the recovery rate (b 4 > 0).
The motivation behind the remaining amnesty program variables is largely derived from the major identifi able structures of these programs that have been discussed throughout this paper. Indicator variables identify whether the state previously enacted an amnesty program, by including controls to indicate if the amnesty is the state's second program (SecondAmnesty) or if it is the third or more frequent program (ThirdAmnesty). Presumably, amnesties would have smaller recoveries with each iteration due to a reduced pool of non-complaint taxpayers, so that b 5 and b 6 are negative. The more time that passes between amnesties (Lag) should increase the recovery rate since the stock of evaders and uncollected accounts accumulates over time. The Lag variable is measured for the regression as "1/(number of months since last amnesty)." Using this inverse relationship allows us to handle the conditionality of repeat amnesties with a consistent ordering. A state never before offering amnesty can be thought of as 1/∞ = 0, an amnesty offered 20 years ago as 1/240 = 0.004, and one ending in the previous month as 1/1 = 1.
If the amnesty program is conducted in a state that also operates a voluntary disclosure program (VDP), then the amnesty program has a smaller marginal benefi t over the state's routine operations, and thus the program will have lower recoveries (b 8 < 0).
29 Also included are dummy variables representing the eligibility of accounts receivable (AcctsReceivable), whether or not taxpayers can pay through an installment plan (Install), and the quarter in which the amnesty program began (Q). 30 The inclusion of accounts receivable should increase collections (b 9 > 0), and if installment plans encourage participation then they will increase recoveries as well (b 10 > 0). Several state amnesty reviews have found that a conventional view among program administrators is that increasing the duration of the amnesty period allows for more participation and amnesty collection. Evidence noted earlier, however, shows a declining recovery per day as the amnesty period becomes longer, suggesting diminishing returns from a longer amnesty. This motivates the pair of dummy variables for the duration of the amnesty, which if the state administrators are correct, will have a positive effect on amnesty recovery (b 11 , b 12 > 0). As also discussed previously, early amnesty programs tended to administer the program late in the calendar year for fear of interfering with regular tax administration responsibilities for both the state authority and the individual taxpayer, but over time they have become more uniform across the year. The control for quarterly dummies will identify if this change in timing has a signifi cant impact on recoveries. Finally, a set of dummy variables for each decade is introduced (Decade). The control for decades is intended to capture institutional changes that might be diffi cult to observe as states transitioned from an emphasis on improved administration and compliance to increased revenue generation. As discussed in the earlier section, our observation that amnesties have increasingly become geared towards revenue generation is based on how states have changed their observed structural features, but regression analysis will demonstrate if this trend remains after controlling for other unobserved features. Table 5 provides the estimates of the regression model under alternative sets of restrictions. 31 Robust standard errors, reported in parentheses, are employed even when the Breusch-Pagan test was unable to reject the null hypothesis of homoskedastic errors. Specifi cation (A) estimates a model with only the controls variables intended to proxy 29 In this dataset, the states that operate a voluntary disclosure program include Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wisconsin. When it was unclear if a state with a current voluntary disclosure program had the program during earlier amnesty programs, it was coded as having one at that time as well. 30 The variable Q is an n × 3 matrix of quarter identifi ers, with the fourth quarter excluded. The parameter α is a 3 × 1 vector of coeffi cients. 31 For dummy variables, the more precise estimation of the marginal effect in a semi-log specifi cation is exp(β) -1, but this is not reported due to space limitations; see Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) for an illustration.
for unpaid tax liabilities, while specifi cation (B) controls only for amnesty program features. Specifi cation (C) combines the fi rst two specifi cations, and specifi cation (D) adds the decade indicators. Specifi cation (E) drops the seven amnesty programs that excluded a major broad-based tax. A residual analysis demonstrates that fi ve outliers result in a skewed distribution of errors, even with the removal of the observations in specifi cation (E). After removing these outliers in specifi cation (F), the residuals take a normal distribution as suggested by skewness and kurtosis tests. The mean varianceinfl ation-factor (VIF), reported for each specifi cation, suggests multicollinearity is not a signifi cant problem.
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Comparing the adjusted-R 2 across specifi cations (A) through (D) suggests most of the explanatory power is derived from the amnesty structure variables. The OLS model has just a few statistically signifi cant variables, likely due to the relatively small number of degrees of freedom and sensitivity to the normal distribution assumptions. One should keep in mind, however, that the sample here is very close to the full population, so statistical signifi cance is more informative about a hypothesized larger sample than for the historical observations. Specifi cations (D) through (F) will serve as the main results when discussing the magnitude of the coeffi cients.
The coeffi cients of the variables in Table 5 generally have the expected signs and are relatively robust in size and sign, with the main difference between specifi cations being in statistical signifi cance. Examining fi rst the four variables measuring the size of unpaid liabilities, only the Recession indicator switches signs across specifi cations, though it is not statistically signifi cant in any specifi cation. Though statistically signifi cant in just two specifi cations, the effect of not having a sales tax takes the expected sign in all specifi cations and the magnitude is relatively constant throughout. For an amnesty program that would otherwise recover 0.5 percent of its annual tax revenue, the fully specifi ed models estimated in columns (D) through (F) suggest the effect of not having a sales tax increases the recovery rate by 0.73 to 0.78 percent. 33 The evidence is similar among states with high federal audit rates. The sign and size of the coeffi cient on HighAuditState are similar across specifi cations, with statistical signifi cance fl uctuating between specifi cations based on degrees of freedom. The effect of being a high audit state reduces an amnesty recovery rate of 0.5 to a recovery rate of 0.42 to 0.33 percent.
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Finally, non-farm proprietors income is positively correlated with greater recovery rates and is statistically signifi cant at the 5 percent level in specifi cations (E) and (F). Those point estimates suggest that a standard deviation increase in the NFPIncomeShr would increase a 0.5 percent recovery rate to 0.63 percent.
35
Turning attention to the amnesty program features, two variables that stand out in Table 5 Notes: Asterisks indicate statistical signifi cance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Specifi cation (E) excludes amnesties that did not permit claims from a major broad-based tax, and (F) excludes outliers.
percent level in all specifi cations, and the point estimates in specifi cations (D) through (F) suggest it would increase a 0.5 percent recovery rate to 1.37 or 2.34 percent.
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This is the largest effect observed among the dummy variables, and is consistent with Mikesell's (1986) early observation that accounts receivable is the main distinguishing feature between amnesty program size, as well as Alm and Beck's (1991) fi nding on the eligibility of delinquent taxpayers. Though accounts receivable is an attribute tax administrators sometimes have control over during amnesty offerings, these also represent the "softest" returns as participation in the amnesty implies the state could probably have collected the entire amount through existing enforcement devices. Amnesties in states that operate a voluntary disclosure program, a competing device that allows delinquent taxpayers to avoid more signifi cant punishment, also experienced lower recovery rates by statistically signifi cant margins. The coeffi cients for voluntary disclosure program suggest they would lower a 0.50 percent recovery rate to about 0.30 percent.
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Despite lacking statistical signifi cance, the signs of the quarter indicators are consistent with the traditional concern that offering amnesties in the beginning of the calendar year would interfere with the collections process. Using the fourth quarter as the reference group, having the amnesty in the fi rst quarter is associated with lower collections while the highest collections occurred in third quarter amnesties. There does not appear to be evidence, however, to support the view that amnesty program length signifi cantly encourages participation. Dummy variables for amnesty program length actually carry a negative sign in many specifi cations, though it is possible that some reverse causality is occurring, and amnesties with low recoveries result in an extension of the size of the window of opportunity.
The evidence from the regressions in Table 5 is that repeated amnesties have smaller recoveries than the fi rst program, though this fi nding is not statistically signifi cant and is sensitive to outliers. Relative to a fi rst amnesty with a one percent recovery rate, the full sample specifi cation in column (D) indicates that the second amnesty has recovery rates that are 0.26 percent points lower, and third or higher amnesties recover 0.19 percentage points less than the initial amnesty. 38 The time lag between amnesties is measured as the inverse number of months, with fi rst amnesties taking a value of zero; this treats amnesties that are far apart as more similar to fi rst amnesties in this measure than those that are closer together. 39 The point estimates indicate that about a 12 month increase in the time since an initial amnesty with a 0.5 percent recovery rate would increase the revenue recovery rate by about 0.04 percentage points, though this is not statistically signifi cant. 40 Likewise, installment plans apparently increase participation enough to increase the recovery rate in specifi cation (D), but the effect is not statistically signifi cant and is sensitive to outliers. Specifi cations (E) and (F) demonstrate that recovery rates have fallen by statistically signifi cant margins during the millennium decade, but this is also sensitive to the choice of sample.
These results are suggestive of the trade-offs confronted by amnesty program administrators. As described earlier, permitting an installment payment plan probably entices some taxpayers to come forward even though it seems many will be unlikely to live up to the terms of the agreement. States have been dropping this feature in the revenue maximizing era in hopes of quickly collecting the full liability, but the evidence presented in Table 5 suggests that the revenue recovered is not substantively infl uenced. This suggests that policy makers can retain this feature of good administration without signifi cantly compromising revenue. Similarly, offering amnesty in the third quarter was done historically to prevent substantial interference with routine collections, while more recently amnesties have become more evenly distributed throughout the year. The evidence suggests that a third quarter beginning is most highly correlated with revenue recovery, although the effect is not statistically signifi cant. Shutting down the program within 60 days also seems to cost no revenue, and shortens the demands on administrative resources. However, if a state wants a large recovery, permitting known delinquencies through accounts receivable and shutting down voluntary disclosure programs seem to have the most to offer in terms of gross recovery, though these changes would confl ict with good existing tax administration policies.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
An exploration of the structures of state tax amnesties and amnesty policies reveals that the purpose of state tax amnesty programs has evolved. Early amnesty programs were coupled with important administrative reforms and efforts at improving compliance and enforcement, while the structure of recent programs and their timing relative to adverse fi scal shocks demonstrates an emphasis on revenue generation. In fact, many of these recent structural changes are inconsistent with an administrative system that values compliance and enforcement. Indeed, a regression analysis of the effects of amnesty features on amnesty recoveries suggests that if states are aggressively pursuing revenue maximization, the factors they can modify that are most infl uential on revenues also compromise existing tax administration. This raises some concerns because the historical record has demonstrated amnesty recoveries are seldom large enough to make any dramatic impact on state fi nances, even compared to non-traditional slack revenue sources such as rainy day funds or lotteries. Even among the early amnesties, which were more interested in long-term compliance and tax administration, the preponderance of evidence suggests that amnesties represent only a temporary revenue shock, not a continuing fi scal base.
Somewhat paradoxically, if state legislatures continue to enact amnesty programs, the belief that there is zero long-term revenue effect at best or a negative effect at worst suggests that administrators should seek to maximize revenue to the greatest possible extent, as it will likely be the only fi scal contribution. Should an amnesty be offered, the empirical evidence from prior programs suggests that gross revenue collections may be increased by making accounts receivable eligible for amnesty relief, by keeping the program open less than 60 days, and by holding the program in the third quarter of the calendar year. States that do not regularly tax sales, have low federal audit rates, and do not operate a voluntary disclosure program are likely to fi nd their recoveries to be higher. Finally, states should recognize that the evidence indicates that historically collections decline with each successive offering and increase with the amount of time since the last amnesty, holding constant the other structural features of the amnesty program.
Several open questions remain regarding even the immediate revenue fl ow -would ordinary state enforcement systems have eventually brought in the revenue, rendering the net effect negative due to waived penalty and interest? Do amnesties have any effect on the perceived fairness of the tax administration system? Does substantial amnesty recovery measure the futility of tax administration, and therefore advertise that successful evasion is quite feasible? The avalanche of tax amnesties since 2000 and generally improving state revenue yields with the end of the Great Recession probably mean a pause in the pace of such programs for a few years. Nevertheless, it appears that such programs have become an accepted tool in state tax administration, as states generally regard their experiences with amnesties to have been successful. 41 As amnesty programs continue, future lawmakers and tax administrators may learn from the experiences of the 117 amnesties in the fi rst 30 years of amnesty history.
APPENDIX A A1. Defi nitions and Sources
Recovery/Revenue is amnesty recovery as a share of total tax revenue collected in the year prior to the amnesty start date, multiplied by one million; revenue data are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Governments Division. No Sales Tax is a dummy variable, where 1 indicates the absence of a state sales tax in the year of the amnesty. High Audit State is a dummy variable, where a value of 1 indicates that the state's mean rank in federal audits from 1997-2001 was in the top-10 most audited; the source is the Transactional Records Access Clearing House of Syracuse University (http://trac.syr.edu). Recession is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if there was a national recession as defi ned by the NBER. NFP Income Shr is the proportion of state personal income from non-farm proprietor's income in the year prior to the amnesty start date; the source is U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov). Second Amnesty is a dummy variable, where 1 indicates a state's second amnesty program. Third+ Amnesty is a 
A2. Amnesty Program and Recovery Data
Data are from the authors' compilation from state amnesty evaluation reports, state press releases, news reports, state statutes, and various third party tabulations. Important third party sources include the Federation of Tax Administrators tabulation available at their website, http:// www.taxadmin.org/, Mikesell (1986) , and Joint Committee on Taxation (1998).
